Extradition between Dubai and the USA

No signed bilateral treaty obligates the UAE to hand anyone over to the United States — and yet extraditions between the two countries happen with real regularity. That combination surprises people until they understand how the mechanism actually works: reciprocity, domestic UAE law, and a 2022 legal assistance agreement fill the gap a treaty would otherwise occupy, producing outcomes that are often just as consequential as if a formal instrument existed.

The United States and the UAE do not have a ratified bilateral extradition treaty. In a classical framework, that would mean Washington has no automatic tool for requesting a person’s surrender, and Dubai’s courts carry no contractual obligation to comply. In practice, the absence of a treaty changes the form of cooperation rather than eliminating it — it converts an obligation into a discretionary decision the UAE makes case by case.

What does exist is the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) between the US and UAE, signed in Abu Dhabi on 24 February 2022. This instrument was formally transmitted to the US Senate for ratification advice and consent in January 2025. It’s worth being precise about what an MLAT actually does: it governs evidence-sharing, witness testimony, asset tracing, and document production between the two countries’ law enforcement authorities — it does not create an obligation to extradite anyone. Confusing the two is one of the more common misunderstandings in this area, and the distinction matters enormously for anyone assessing their actual legal exposure.

On the UAE’s domestic side, extradition matters are governed by Federal Law No. 39 of 2006 on international judicial cooperation in criminal matters, as later reinforced by Federal Decree-Law No. 38 of 2023. This legislation gives UAE authorities the discretion to grant a US extradition request even without a bilateral treaty in place, provided the request satisfies a defined set of domestic conditions.

Instead of a binding legal obligation, US requests to the UAE proceed under the principle of comity and reciprocity — the US Department of Justice submits a request through diplomatic channels, effectively signalling its willingness to grant a comparable request from the UAE in return, without either side being bound by treaty text.

Multilateral conventions also do real work here. Where the alleged conduct falls under the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime or the UN Convention against Corruption — both ratified by the US and the UAE — these instruments function as a substitute legal basis, particularly relevant to money laundering, drug trafficking, and cybercrime cases, categories that increasingly dominate US requests directed at the UAE.

None of this amounts to a safety net. No treaty is not the same as immunity — the UAE can and does grant US extradition requests through reciprocity, the conventions above, or, in a number of documented cases, through administrative deportation rather than a court-supervised extradition process at all.

Even without a binding treaty, UAE courts don’t approve a US request on request alone. Dubai’s Court of Cassation has applied a consistently strict filter, requiring:

Alongside these, two further principles apply regardless of the treaty gap. Non bis in idem blocks a renewed prosecution for conduct someone has already been acquitted of, or convicted and served a sentence for — including where a conviction was later pardoned or covered by a federal amnesty for the same charge. And genuine human rights protections remain in force: a credible risk of torture or inhuman treatment can justify refusal unless the requesting state provides adequate guarantees.

A term that comes up often in this context is “hidden extradition.” Rather than pursuing the lengthier court-supervised process, UAE authorities can — and in high-profile cases, do — use administrative deportation to remove someone from the country far faster than a judicial extradition would allow.

The mechanism works by declaring a foreign national’s presence in the UAE undesirable, typically on grounds of a threat to public order or an immigration violation. Once the person’s visa is cancelled, deportation follows quickly, framed as removal to their home country or a third country. In practice, though, the route and timing are often coordinated directly with US authorities. The case of Nigerian national Ramon Abbas (“Hushpuppi”) illustrates this well: he was handed to FBI agents and transported to the United States in under a month from arrest — bypassing the standard extradition court process entirely.

Certain protections apply regardless of the treaty gap. Article 38 of the UAE Constitution absolutely prohibits the extradition of the UAE’s own nationals. Where a UAE citizen is alleged to have committed an offence in the US, the American side must instead transfer the case file to the UAE Public Prosecution for local proceedings — the standard aut dedere aut judicare principle (“extradite or prosecute”).

Additional protection applies to individuals who have obtained refugee status or can demonstrate genuine political motivation behind their prosecution — though the burden of proving that political context rests entirely with the defence, which must show the US request is aimed at persecution rather than legitimate criminal justice.

The UAE’s posture toward US requests has hardened considerably in recent years, driven largely by pressure from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Demonstrating genuine cooperation on money laundering and financial crime has become a visible priority for Emirati authorities, and requests tied to securities fraud, cryptocurrency schemes, and money laundering are now handled with noticeably more urgency than a few years ago. Courts increasingly treat “white-collar” financial cases as serious criminal matters rather than civil disputes best left to private resolution — a shift that measurably increases the risk of a request being granted.

A US request to the UAE, whichever legal basis it rests on, still needs a complete evidentiary package: identifying details of the person sought, a description of the alleged facts and supporting evidence, the arrest warrant or existing sentence, the penalty that applies, and a clear basis for dual criminality. That package goes to the UAE’s competent authorities, typically the Ministry of Justice, and where an Interpol Red Notice has already been issued, coordination with the UAE’s Interpol bureau frequently becomes part of the process as well.

Where flight risk is a genuine concern, UAE authorities can place the person under provisional arrest, capped at 60 days, to allow time for the full documentation to arrive and be verified. The detained person appears before a Dubai court, which explains the grounds for detention — and this is the stage at which a lawyer can request bail, though the outcome depends on the severity of the alleged offence and the court’s own read on flight risk. If the underlying request looks unfounded even at this early stage, provisional detention can end there.

Court sessions that follow examine whether the conduct in question is genuinely criminal, whether it satisfies dual criminality, whether political or religious motivation taints the case, and whether human rights and fair trial standards are being respected. The ruling on admissibility can, in some cases, ultimately shift to the executive branch — the Ministry of Justice, the Public Prosecution, or senior UAE authorities — rather than resting with the court alone. Appeal and cassation mechanisms exist under UAE law, but the deadlines for using them are strict, and delay tends to cost real options rather than simply postponing them.

Federal Law No. 39 guarantees a defined set of rights regardless of whether a treaty underlies the request: legal counsel from the moment of detention, a defence strategy built around both UAE law and whatever international framework applies, access to the specific charges and underlying request, and the right to court representation and appeal.

Without active legal representation, a person can be surrendered through an expedited administrative route even where the underlying US request is flawed or effectively politically motivated — precisely the scenario experienced counsel exists to prevent. Detention pending a decision isn’t indefinite: in most systems, including the UAE’s, it cannot exceed 60 days without a fresh court decision, and authorities are expected to weigh alternatives to custody rather than defaulting to it.

Once the UAE places someone in provisional detention on a US matter, that person is typically barred from leaving the country, disrupting both personal life and any business they operate locally. Proceedings — particularly where reciprocity and diplomatic negotiation are involved rather than a straightforward treaty process — can stretch on for months or longer, often with the person remaining in custody throughout.

Financial consequences frequently precede any final ruling. US authorities can petition to freeze accounts and assets, including those held in the UAE, and banks — wary of facilitating sanctions evasion or money laundering — often act pre-emptively on international warrants. Related businesses, joint holdings, and shared accounts can be drawn into the same scrutiny, and media coverage of a criminal case can independently damage share prices, investor confidence, and licensing decisions from UAE authorities.

The absence of a formal extradition treaty doesn’t reduce the need for specialist representation — if anything, it increases it, since the outcome depends more heavily on discretionary factors: how the request is framed, whether reciprocity or an MLAT-based rationale is being used, and how UAE authorities currently weigh diplomatic relations with Washington.

Counsel typically starts by determining whether a genuine US arrest warrant or Interpol notice exists at all, and what that means for real detention risk in the UAE. From there, the substance of the American charges is measured against UAE law to test whether dual criminality genuinely holds, and other grounds for refusal — expired limitations, insufficient evidence, a political dimension to the prosecution — are identified early, since some arguments can only be raised at the earliest hearings.

During provisional detention, the priority shifts to securing reasonable conditions and, where grounds exist, challenging the legality of the detention itself. Building the defence file means documenting factual inconsistencies, procedural defects, or human rights concerns, bringing in translators or subject-matter experts where the case requires it — and, where the matter began with an Interpol Red Notice, pursuing a parallel challenge through the Commission for the Control of Interpol’s Files (CCF) to remove the underlying notice regardless of how the extradition question itself resolves.

If you or someone close to you is facing an extradition request between the UAE and the USA, the time to act is now — not after a court date has already been set. Contact our team for a confidential case assessment: we’ll review the legality of the request, identify which grounds for refusal genuinely apply, and build a coordinated defence strategy from provisional detention through to final resolution — including, where appropriate, a parallel challenge to remove an Interpol Red Notice through the CCF. Get in touch today to protect your rights.